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111 
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: Why the Qualified 
Individual Analysis Is the New Battleground for 
Employment Discrimination Suits 
I. Introduction 
It is a well-accepted principle in our modern society that individuals 
should not suffer discrimination in the workplace on account of their 
disabilities. Congress sought to support this ideal by passing the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).1 After the Supreme Court handed 
down narrowing constructions of what constitutes a “disability” near the 
turn of the twenty-first century,2 Congress breathed new life into the ADA 
through enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 
2008 (Amendments Act).3 Now, nearly five years after the Amendments 
Act first became effective on January 1, 2009,4 concrete patterns have 
finally emerged from federal court opinions interpreting its major changes. 
These results provide an exciting look at the Amendments Act’s effect and 
a glimpse of its future implications in the employment context.  
The most astonishing consequence of the Amendments Act is its 
expansion of the definition of a disability. Because a plaintiff must prove 
that she is disabled as an element of her prima facie claim,5 such an 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Pub. L. No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12101-12213 (2012)).   
 2. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197-98 (2002), 
superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(b)(4), 122 
Stat. 3553, 3554; Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999), superseded by 
statute, § 2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. at 3554.     
 3. 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012)). Some scholars refer 
to this Amendment as the “ADAAA.” See, e.g., Jill C. Anderson, Misreading Like  a 
Lawyer: Cognitive Bias in Statutory Interpretation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1564 (2014). 
Although there is no substantive difference between these different monikers, this Comment 
primarily uses the phrase “Amendments Act” for its perceived ease of reading.    
 4. § 8, 122 Stat. at 3559. Though the Amendments Act became effective January 1, 
2009, most federal courts of appeals agree that it does not apply retroactively and, therefore, 
applies only to discriminatory conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009. See Shin v. 
Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 369 F. App’x 472, 478 n.14 (4th Cir. 2010); Becerril v. Pima 
Cnty. Assessor’s Office, 587 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009); Thornton v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., 587 F.3d 27, 34 n.3 (1st Cir. 2009); Milholland v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 
569 F.3d 562, 565-67 (6th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Agro Distribution, LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 
n.8 (5th Cir. 2009).      
 5. See McDaniel v. Piedmont Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 22, No. CIV–11–373–M, 2012 WL 
1227154, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 11, 2012) (citing EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 
1028, 1037-38 (10th Cir. 2011)).  
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expansion reflects a major change in all disability discrimination suits. In 
response to the congressional indication that the initial determination of 
whether an employee is disabled “should not demand extensive analysis,”6 
courts applying the Amendments Act almost always find that an 
employee’s impairment “substantially limits one or more [of her] major life 
activities.”7 In fact, as a result of the Amendments Act, courts often assume 
the presence of a disability when there is a close call on whether the 
employee’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity.8 This 
failure to provide an individualized assessment of the limiting nature of a 
person’s impairment undermines the importance of the threshold question 
under the original ADA: whether the employee is disabled.9  
Ultimately, this Comment addresses the overexpansion of the definition 
of a disability and shows how the determination of whether an employee is 
a qualified individual under the ADA has become the major battleground in 
disability discrimination suits. Part II outlines the basic statutes and 
regulations that govern employment discrimination suits brought under the 
ADA. Part III shows that the qualified individual analysis has become the 
key inquiry in disability discrimination suits and explores the practical 
effects of this change on employment practices. To illustrate the 
Amendments Act in action, Part III also uses an empirical study to illustrate 
that plaintiffs’ chances of surviving summary judgment are much higher 
under the Amendments Act than under the original ADA. Part IV contends 
that the Amendments Act has gone too far in expanding who qualifies as 
disabled under the ADA, explores the interpretational problems that have 
arisen under the Amendments Act, and offers suggestions for the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to resolve these problems 
where possible. Finally, Part V considers what precedential value survives 
from pre-Amendments Act case law in light of the significant reform 
brought about by the Amendments Act.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 6. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. at 3554.  
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012).   
 8. See infra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.   
 9. See, e.g., Ivey v. First Quality Retail Serv., 490 F. App’x 281, 285 (11th Cir. 2012); 
see also Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j)(3) (2014). 
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II. Disability Discrimination Framework Provided by Congress and the 
EEOC 
Employers and practitioners are often plagued by their misunderstanding 
of the major employment revisions in Title I of the Amendments Act.10 In 
order to understand what employers’ responsibilities are under the Act, one 
must first appreciate the basic structure of the ADA and the hierarchy of 
authority that Congress established under it. The principal provision of the 
ADA forbids an employer from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified 
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, 
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.”11 An employer will also be liable for failing to make 
“reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of 
an otherwise qualified individual with a disability,” unless the employer can 
establish that the accommodation “would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of the business.”12  
Under either avenue of liability, the ADA instructs that a court’s 
determination of whether a person is disabled under the ADA requires an 
“individualized assessment”—not a presumption.13 In order to establish a 
prima facie claim, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that she (1) is a disabled 
person as defined by the ADA; (2) is qualified, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job held or 
desired; and (3) suffered discrimination by an employer or prospective 
employer on the basis of that disability.”14    
A. Statutory Definition of a “Disability”  
There are three types of disabilities under the ADA, and a plaintiff can 
proceed under any one or combination of them.15 Under the ADA, a person 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See, e.g., Saley v. Caney Fork, LLC, 886 F. Supp. 2d 837, 849-52 (M.D. Tenn. 
2012) (where the employer suffered from a basic misunderstanding of the changes to the 
“regarded as” prong made by the Amendments Act). Although a substantial portion of the 
ADA was directed at public services (Title II) and public accommodations (Title III), this 
Comment focuses on disability law in the employment context under Title I of the ADA, 
which is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2012).    
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).   
 12. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).   
 13. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (2014).   
 14. McDaniel v. Piedmont Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 22, No. CIV–11–373–M, 2012 WL 
1227154, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 11, 2012) (depicting a common formulation of the prima 
facie claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)).   
 15. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(2).   
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is disabled if he (1) has a “physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities”; (2) has “a record of such an 
impairment”; or (3) is “regarded as having such an impairment (as 
described in paragraph (3)).”16 Paragraph 3, which was not introduced until 
the passage of the Amendments Act, explains that a person claiming that 
she has been “regarded as” disabled must only prove that an employer 
discriminated against her “because of an actual or perceived physical or 
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to 
limit a major life activity.”17   
Although Congress did not define “major life activities” within the 
Amendments Act, it created a nonexhaustive list of major life activities, 
including “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, 
eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, 
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”18 
According to the Amendments Act, major life activities also encompass the 
operation of major bodily functions, including the “functions of the immune 
system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, 
respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”19 The 
Amendments Act’s inclusion of major bodily functions as “major life 
activities” is a brand new component of the ADA analysis and was intended 
to provide coverage for chronic impairments that can be substantially 
limiting.20  
                                                                                                                 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(C). These are commonly referred to, respectively, as the 
“actual disability” prong, the “record of” prong, and the “regarded as” prong. 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(g)(2).    
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (emphasis added). Although a plaintiff no longer must 
prove that the employer perceives her impairment as limiting a major life activity, there is at 
least a temporal limitation on plaintiffs proceeding under the “regarded as” prong. Those 
bringing claims under this prong cannot succeed if the impairment is both transitory and 
minor. Id. § 12102(3)(B) (explaining that a transitory impairment is one “with an actual or 
expected duration of 6 months or less”). EEOC regulations reinforce that an employee can 
still succeed under the “regarded as” prong even if his perceived impairment is transitory or 
minor, so long as it is not both. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(iii). Thus, an individual perceived 
to suffer from an extremely minor impairment could typically survive the summary 
judgment stage, so long as her impairment lasts longer than six months. See id.; Interpretive 
Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 
1630.2(l) (2014).  
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).   
 19. Id. § 12102(2)(B).  
 20. See Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i) (2014) (listing HIV infection and cirrhosis of the liver 
caused by Hepatitis B as chronic impairments that affect major bodily functions).   
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss1/3
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The ADA (revised by the Amendments Act) provides the basic 
framework for determining whether someone is disabled. The principal 
command of the Amendments Act is that the definition of disability should 
be construed “in favor of broad coverage of individuals,” and “[t]he term 
‘substantially limits’ shall be interpreted consistently with the findings and 
purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.”21 Furthermore, an 
impairment need only substantially limit one major life activity,22 and “[a]n 
impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would 
substantially limit a major life activity when active.”23 Lastly, in rejecting 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,24 
Congress explained that “[t]he determination of whether an impairment 
substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the 
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures,”25 except for the “mitigating 
measures of ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses.”26 Thus, under the 
Amendments Act’s changes, the disability determination must be made in 
the broadest sense possible—both the concept of a “major life activity” and 
the circumstances where an individual’s impairment “substantially limits” a 
major life activity have been dramatically expanded.  
B. EEOC Regulations and Interpretive Guidance  
Congress entrusted a great deal of the ultimate decision-making power to 
the EEOC by granting it authority “to issue regulations implementing the 
definition[] of disability in Section 12102 of [the ADA].”27 Accordingly, 
the EEOC dedicated a substantial portion of its ADA regulations to 
defining what “substantially limits” a major life activity.28 The EEOC 
divided most of its guidance into two distinct parts: (1) specific regulations 
                                                                                                                 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)-(B).   
 22. Id. § 12102(4)(C).  
 23. Id. § 12102(4)(D).   
 24. 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554. 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i) (2012).  
 26. Id. § 12102(4)(E)(ii). 
 27. Id. § 12205a. Although Congress also granted the authority to issue regulations to 
the Attorney General and the Secretary of Transportation, the EEOC regulations are the most 
comprehensive set of guidelines and are tailored exclusively for disability discrimination 
suits brought under Title I of the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(b) (2012) (stating that 
covered entities under the EEOC regulations are employers, employment agencies, labor 
organizations, or joint labor management committees).       
 28. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)-(5) (outlining what impairments will almost always substantially 
limit a major life activity).   
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that mirror and further elaborate upon the statutes implementing the 
Amendments Act,29 and (2) the Interpretive Guidance appended after the 
regulations.30      
The starting point for the disability analysis is determining what 
constitutes an impairment—only then can a court decide whether that 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity. EEOC regulations 
define a physical or mental impairment as “(1) [a]ny physiological disorder 
or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or 
more body systems, . . . or (2) [a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such 
as an intellectual disability . . . , organic brain syndrome, emotional or 
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.”31  
EEOC regulations elaborate upon the disability analysis in several ways. 
For example, the EEOC has added several major life activities and major 
bodily functions to the nonexhaustive lists created by the Amendments 
Act.32 In addition, the EEOC resolved a circuit split by concluding that 
employers are not required to provide accommodations to employees who 
claim a disability “solely under the ‘regarded as’ prong.”33 Furthermore, the 
regulations include fairly substantial coverage of the “regarded as” prong to 
supplement the Amendments Act’s revision of this prong.34  
EEOC regulations promulgated soon after the original ADA was passed 
also clarify the second prong of the plaintiff’s prima facie claim, adding a 
second element that a plaintiff must meet in order to be deemed a “qualified 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. §§ 1630.1-1630.16.  
 30. Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1630 app. (2014).   
 31. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).    
 32. Id. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i) (adding sitting, reaching, and interacting with others to the list 
of major life activities); id. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii) (adding special sense organs, skin, 
genitourinary, cardiovascular, hemic, lymphatic, and musculoskeletal functions to the list of 
major bodily functions).     
 33. Id. § 1630.9(e). Before the adoption of the Amendments Act, the federal circuits 
were split regarding whether employees claiming that they were regarded as disabled 
deserved reasonable accommodations. See Ryan v. Columbus Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 
No. 7:10–CV–234–BR, 2012 WL 1230234, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 12, 2012). Compare 
Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1231-33 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that 
there is no duty to accommodate an individual who is regarded as having a disability), and 
Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1999) (same), with Kelly v. Metallics 
W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 675-76 (10th Cir. 2005) (concluding that there is a duty to 
accommodate an individual who is regarded as having a disability), and Williams v. Phila. 
Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 772-76 (3d Cir. 2004) (same).  
 34. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(g)(3), (j)(2), (l).  
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individual” with a disability.35 In addition to being capable of performing 
the essential functions of the position, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, the EEOC also instructs that an employee must possess 
“the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related 
requirements of the employment position” she holds or desires.36  
The Interpretive Guidance contains analysis found in neither the 
Amendments Act nor the EEOC regulations. For example, the Interpretive 
Guidance is now the only place that explains when an individual is 
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, even though that 
discussion was included in the regulations prior to the Amendments Act.37 
The EEOC removed this discussion from the regulations because, in light of 
the expanded list of major life activities, the EEOC concluded plaintiffs 
would need to rely on using the major life activity of working “in only very 
targeted situations.”38 Additionally, the Interpretive Guidance provides the 
reasoning behind the various decisions made by the EEOC and makes 
several references to the goals articulated by Congress in the legislative 
history of the Amendments Act.39 Because the Interpretive Guidance 
contains the most thorough analysis of the recent changes to the ADA, 
practitioners and employers must reference it to thoroughly grasp all of the 
applicable rules under the Amendments Act. Of course, now that the 
Amendments Act and accompanying regulations have become effective in 
most new cases, the force of the new statutes, regulations, and Interpretive 
Guidance is slowly playing itself out in court.                         
III. The Departure from Disability Analysis and Shift in Focus to Job 
Qualifications 
 While plaintiffs fare much better under the Amendments Act in proving 
that they are disabled, recent case law suggests that courts are nonetheless 
more frequently granting summary judgment to employers because 
plaintiff-employees are not “qualified individuals” within the meaning of 
the ADA.40 This result could be attributable to the fact that although 
Congress significantly expanded the definition of disability under the 
Amendments Act, the second and third elements of an employee’s prima 
                                                                                                                 
 35. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2014).  
 36. Id.  
 37. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i) (2014).      
 38. Id. § 1630.2(j)(5) and (6). 
 39. See, e.g., id. § 1630.2(j)(1).   
 40. See infra Part III.A.1-2.  
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facie claim have remained largely untouched.41 As alluded to previously, 
the plaintiff still bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating all three prima 
facie elements.42 
Due to the increased importance of the qualified individual analysis, 
written job descriptions now play a vital role in a court’s determination of 
whether an employee can adequately perform his job in spite of having a 
disability. This shift in focus that Congress spurred will force employers to 
update their written job descriptions to reflect the key expectations of their 
employees. But has Congress also created a perverse incentive for 
employers to screen out potentially disabled individuals in the hiring 
process?  
A. Developments in the Case Law Interpreting the Amendments Act   
There has been an outpouring of scholarly literature predicting how the 
Amendments Act would affect ADA discrimination suits.43 Only recently, 
though, have opinions interpreting the Amendments Act materialized in 
case law.44 Analyzing some of these cases will illustrate the trends 
developing in the aftermath of the Amendments Act. In order to portray 
these developments, I gathered statistics for the success rate of ADA 
plaintiffs at the summary judgment phase of employment discrimination 
                                                                                                                 
 41. As noted above, the plaintiff has the burden of proving he (1) has a disability; (2) is 
a qualified individual; and (3) suffered discrimination on the basis of his disability. 
McDaniel v. Piedmont Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 22, No. CIV–11–373–M, 2012 WL 1227154, at 
*3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 11, 2012). One minor alteration must be noted. The Amendments Act 
changed the third prima facie element so that it now prohibits “employers from making 
employment-related decisions ‘on the basis of’ (as opposed to ‘because of’) an employee’s 
disability.” Nayak v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., No. 1:12–cv–0817–RLY–
MJD, 2013 WL 121838, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013). Nayak found that this small revision 
does not transform the ADA’s but-for causation requirement into a mixed-motive statute, 
meaning the rule that an employer will only be liable for discrimination under the “regarded 
as” prong where he would not have terminated the employee but for the employee’s 
disability remains after the Amendments Act. Id. at *3-*4. Judging from this decision, the 
alteration of the third prima facie element will likely have little or no effect on ADA 
discrimination suits.  
 42. See Lloyd v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, Ala., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1262 (M.D. 
Ala. 2012). 
 43. See, e.g., Amelia Michele Joiner, The ADAAA: Opening the Floodgates, 47 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 331, 366-69 (2010); Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Enfeebling the ADA: The ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 667, 669-70 (2010).      
 44. Because the Amendments Act does not apply retroactively, only discriminatory 
actions occurring after January 1, 2009, are scrutinized under the Amendment’s changes to 
the ADA. See supra note 4.  
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suits from January 1, 2012 through January 15, 2013 (the Amendments Act 
study) and compared them to statistics gathered in a similar pre-
Amendments Act study (the Berger study) for the years 2000 and 2001.45 
Comparing these studies reveals that since the Amendments Act became 
effective, federal courts have granted summary judgment to employers with 
a noticeably declining frequency. More surprisingly, the Amendments Act 
has also affected the bases for courts’ decisions in ways that might not have 
been anticipated by most legal commentators.         
A court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion—rather than the results 
of a trial or motion to dismiss—represents the superior benchmark for 
measuring the impact of the changes in the ADA. The Amendments Act has 
not been in place long enough for an appreciable number of ADA 
discrimination suits to proceed to trial.46 Thus, the time is not yet ripe to see 
if the Amendments Act will enable employees to improve upon their 
historically low win percentages in ADA discrimination trials.47 The Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal stage is also an inappropriate benchmark because courts 
often grant dismissal for reasons unrelated to the merits of an employee’s 
disability discrimination claim, especially when pro se plaintiffs are 
involved.48 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Vivian Berger, Michael O. Finkelstein, & Kenneth Cheung, Summary Judgment 
Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 45, 50-65 (2005).   
 46. Kathryn Moss et al., Prevalence and Outcomes of ADA Employment Discrimination 
Claims in the Federal Courts, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 303, 307 (2005) 
(finding that, on average, ADA claims are resolved fourteen months after the plaintiff files a 
claim). 
 47. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 
34 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) (“[D]efendants prevail in more than ninety-three 
percent of reported ADA employment discrimination cases decided on the merits at the trial 
court level.”); see also Amy L. Allbright, 2009 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title 
I—Survey Update, 34 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 339, 339-40 (2010) (finding 
that employers won in 97.4% of ADA discrimination suits in 2009, where the study counted 
an employer “win” as either a victory after trial or the dismissal of an employee’s claim 
before trial). But see Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment 
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 445 tbl. 2 
(2004) (showing that from 1998 to 2001 employees prevailed 41.27% of the time in ADA 
jury trials).   
 48. Wendy Wilkinson, Judicially Crafted Barriers to Bringing Suit Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 907, 908 (1997) (“[M]any cases have 
been poorly pleaded as it appears from many case histories that sufficient, undisputed 
evidence was not offered to establish coverage.”). For an example of such a case, see Fierro 
v. Knight Transp., No. EP–12–CV–00218–DCG, 2012 WL 4321304, at *2-*5 (W.D. Tex. 
Sept. 18, 2012).    
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The grant or denial of summary judgment is a more appropriate indicator 
of the turning of the tide in ADA discrimination lawsuits. Courts’ 
determinations at this stage more accurately depict the relative success of 
the parties because ADA discrimination lawsuits rarely proceed to trial.49 
Indeed, most employment discrimination lawsuits—perhaps as many as 
70% of such lawsuits—are terminated by settlement.50 Consequently, the 
major bargaining position lies at the summary judgment phase of 
discrimination suits, when an employer moves for summary judgment. 
From the employer’s perspective, she would rather spend her money 
pursuing a summary judgment ruling than settling “in order to limit other 
employees’ incentives to sue.”51 From the employee’s perspective, she may 
be “blinded by serious emotional and financial distress,” causing her to be 
overly optimistic about her likelihood of success until summary judgment is 
denied.52 Even though a denial of summary judgment does not technically 
terminate a case, once (and if) the court denies summary judgment, the 
employer will “become serious” about settling, and thus as a practical 
matter, the case will be terminated in the typical employment 
discrimination suit.53 
1. Plaintiffs Are More Likely to Survive Summary Judgment in the Post-
Amendments Act Era: Statistics 
The newly discovered empirical data from the Amendments Act study 
shows that plaintiffs have experienced greater success at the summary 
judgment stage under the Amendments Act than they previously had under 
the original ADA. In their 2000–2001 study, Berger, Finkelstein, and 
Cheung analyzed the rate at which plaintiffs bringing various 
discrimination claims were able to survive their employers’ motions for 
summary judgment in the federal district courts of the Second Circuit.54 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities, 
Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 
276-77 (2000).  
 50. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 47, at 440.  
 51. Eliza Kaiser, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Unfulfilled Promise for 
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 735, 740 (2004).    
 52. Berger, Finkelstein & Cheung, supra note 45, at 46, 48.   
 53. Id. at 48. 
 54. Id. at 50-52. Berger, Finkelstein, and Cheung compiled their data using two 
methods: by conducting a Westlaw search using key terms associated with employment 
discrimination suits and by compiling a list of all filings coded under the heading (“Civil 
rights: jobs”) from the PACER online database. Id. at 51-53. The Berger study only includes 
cases from the Second Circuit, whereas the Amendments Act study contains cases from all 
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Cases involving pro se plaintiffs were excluded from the statistics, owing to 
the substantial distorting effect pro se cases had on the sample.55 
Additionally, data collected from Westlaw was adjusted for “publication 
bias,” which refers to the tendency of courts to issue a higher number of 
written opinions for decisions granting summary judgment than those 
denying summary judgment.56 With respect to disability claims brought 
under the ADA, the Berger study found that employees survived summary 
judgment only 24.3% of the time (or in nine out of thirty-seven cases) in all 
of the district courts of the Second Circuit combined.57 In fact, ADA 
plaintiffs had the lowest summary judgment survival rate compared to all 
other employment discrimination plaintiffs analyzed in the Berger study.58  
Notably, the summary judgment denial percentage would have been even 
lower if the sample of district courts did not include New York.59 Because 
New York’s state disability laws defined “disability” more broadly than the 
original ADA, a discernible number of suits survived summary judgment 
merely because plaintiffs’ pendent state claims defeated summary 
                                                                                                                 
federal jurisdictions. Because the data for the Berger study and Amendments Act study come 
from different courts, the comparison of the two surveys is admittedly somewhat of an 
“apples and oranges” comparison. However, because the Amendments Act study contains 
opinions from a wide array of courts—thereby diminishing the influence of the occasional 
“pro-employer” or “pro-employee” jurisdiction—I believe any distorting effect from using 
cases outside of the Second Circuit in the Amendments Act study is minimal. This 
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Second Circuit has been described as having both 
“pro-employee” and “pro-employer” tendencies by different commentators. See Richard L. 
Merrick, The Bankruptcy Dynamics of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 19 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 301, 343 (1986) (pro-employee); Brandy S. Parrish, Note, Walking an Evidentiary 
Tightrope: the Aftermath of Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 31 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 677, 707 (2001) (pro-employer).    
 55. Id. at 56, 57 tbl. 3. 
 56. Id. at 52; see also Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg 
from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1133, 1146 (1990) (“[I]t is almost certainly the case that 
rulings that dispose of a case are more likely to be written and more likely to be 
published.”). Because the data collected for this Comment was also gathered from an online 
database (WestlawNext), and in order to maintain an accurate comparison, only the results 
obtained by the Berger study before this “adjustment” will be used for comparison to the 
Amendments Act results shown in Table 1, infra.  
 57. Berger, Finkelstein & Cheung, supra note 45, at 59, 60 tbl. 5. Even after the 
adjustment for publication bias, the study revealed that employees survived summary 
judgment in only 32.1% of the relevant ADA cases. Id.  
 58. Id. at 60 tbl. 5 (compiling data for race, sex, and age discrimination claims, as well 
as retaliation claims). 
 59. Id. at 62-63. 
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judgment, even though their federal ADA claims did not survive.60 Also, an 
even lower percentage of summary judgment denials likely existed for the 
near decade following the study,61 owing to the fact that the Berger study 
preceded the Supreme Court’s major disability-narrowing opinions: Sutton 
v. United Air Lines, Inc.,62 and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. 
v. Williams.63 
In order to achieve a parallel comparison to the Berger study, to the 
fullest extent possible I used the same methodology utilized in the Berger 
study to collect summary judgment statistics in the Amendments Act 
study.64 The results of the Amendments Act study are depicted in Table 1 
below, revealing that employees survived their employers’ summary 
judgment motions at a rate of 39.2%,65 representing an increase of 14.9% 
from the summary judgment survival rate plaintiffs achieved under the 
ADA in 2000–2001.66  
                                                                                                                 
 60. Id.; see also N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(21) (McKinney 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 1998). 
The data coding process employed by Berger, Finkelstein, and Cheung regarded plaintiffs as 
surviving summary judgment so long as one of their claims survived the summary judgment 
phase, even if summary judgment was granted to the employer on the federal ADA claim. 
See Berger, Finkelstein, & Cheung, supra note 45, at 51.     
 61. See Allbright, supra note 47, at 342 tbl. 4 (showing the years 2003-2009 had some 
of the lowest ADA plaintiff win percentages in the history of the ADA). But see Jones, supra 
note 43, at 692 (noting that ADA plaintiffs actually fared better when appealing to the circuit 
courts in the early wake of Toyota and Sutton than they had previously).  
 62. 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554. 
 63. 534 U.S. 184, 200-02 (2002), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 
2008, § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. at 3554. 
 64. To this end, I used a broad key-term search in WestlawNext to yield as many Title I 
discrimination and failure to accommodate cases as possible. Collecting cases from January 
1, 2012, through January 15, 2013, I searched all federal district and circuit courts, using the 
search phrase “(ADAAA & disability & discrimination).” Then, I individually analyzed each 
opinion to ensure that the Amendments Act (not the original ADA) applied to the lawsuit. 
All opinions other than summary judgment dispositions were screened from the sample. 
And, like in the Berger study, all pro se cases were excluded from the sample. Summary 
judgment was only considered denied where at least one of the plaintiff’s federal 
Amendments Act claims (either alleging discriminatory conduct or a failure to 
accommodate) survived summary judgment; the disposition of any pendent state claims was 
disregarded.  
 65. See infra Table 1.  
 66. See Berger, Finkelstein, & Cheung, supra note 45, at 60 tbl. 5. Even assuming that 
the WestlawNext search conducted for this Comment contained no publication bias, there 
would still be an increase in the rate in which employees survive summary judgment under 
the ADA. That is, if every written opinion in every federal court was available on 
WestlawNext and found through this author’s search (an inconceivable proposition, given 
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Table 1: Summary Judgment Statistics for Employers’ Motions for 
Summary Judgment in Amendments Act Cases, Jan. 1, 2012–Jan. 15, 2013, 
All Federal Courts 
Summary Judgment Granted  Summary Judgment Denied 
    31/51 (60.8%)67    20/51 (39.2%)68 
                                                                                                                 
the fact that not all opinions are published on Westlaw), the rate of summary judgment 
denial would still be 7.1% higher for Amendments Act cases (39.2%) than for the adjusted 
summary judgment survival rate under the Berger study (32.1%). See id. 
 67. See Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 91 (1st Cir. 2012); Wurzel v. 
Whirlpool Corp., 482 F. App’x 1, 2 (6th Cir. 2012); Wirey v. Richland Cmty. Coll., 913 F. 
Supp. 2d 633, 635 (C.D. Ill. 2012); Mashek v. Soo Line R.R. Co., No. 11–487 (MJD/JJG), 
2012 WL 6552795, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2012); Johnson v. City of Murray, 909 F. Supp. 
2d 1265, 1273 (D. Utah 2012); Angell v. Fairmount Fire Prot. Dist., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 
1255 (D. Colo. 2012); Walker v. Venetian Casino Resort, LLC, No. 02:10–CV–00195–
LRH–VCF, 2012 WL 4794149, at *16 (D. Nev. Oct. 9, 2012); Fossesigurani v. City of 
Bridgeport Fire Dep’t, No. 3:11–cv–752 (VLB), 2012 WL 4512772, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 1, 
2012); Torres v. Bremen Castings, Inc., No. 3:11–CV–035, 2012 WL 4498876, at *1 (N.D. 
Ind. Sept. 28, 2012); Karr v. Napolitano, No. C 11–02207 LB, 2012 WL 4462919, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2012); Love v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp.–N. Miss., Inc., No. 2:10CV176–
SA–JMV, 2012 WL 4465569, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 25, 2012); Mota v. Aaron’s Sales & 
Lease Ownership, No. 11–4298, 2012 WL 3815332, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2012); Howze 
v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm., for Econ. Opportunity, No. 2:11–CV–52–VEH, 2012 WL 
3775871, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 28, 2012); Howard v. Steris Corp., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 
1283 (M.D. Ala. 2012); Poper v. SCA Ams., Inc., No. 10–3201, 2012 WL 3288111, at *1 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2012); Beatty v. Hudco Indus. Prods., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1356 
(N.D. Ala. 2012); Jenkins v. Med. Labs. of E. Iowa, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 946, 966 (N.D. 
Iowa 2012); Lohf v. Great Plains Mfg., Inc., No. 10–1177–RDR, 2012 WL 2568170, at *9 
(D. Kan. July 2, 2012); Bar-Meir v. Univ. of Minn., No. 10–936 (SRN/JJK), 2012 WL 
2402849, at *6 (D. Minn. June 26, 2012); Robinson v. Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 
10–CV–834 (SJF)(ETB), 2012 WL 1980410, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2012); Ratcliff v. 
Mountain Brook Bd. of Educ., No. 2:11–CV–0029–KOB, 2012 WL 1884898, at *1 (N.D. 
Ala. May 22, 2012); Diaz v. City of Phila., No. 11–671, 2012 WL 1657866, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 
May 10, 2012); Lloyd v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, Ala., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1257 
(M.D. Ala. 2012); Curley v. City of N. Las Vegas, No. 2:09–CV–01071–KJD–VCF, 2012 
WL 1439060, at *8 (D. Nev. Apr. 25, 2012); Sechler v. Modular Space Corp., No. 4:10–
CV–5177, 2012 WL 1355586, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2012); Ryan v. Columbus Reg’l 
Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 7:10–CV–234–BR, 2012 WL 1230234, at *10 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 12, 
2012); McDaniel v. Piedmont Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 22, No. CIV–11–373–M, 2012 WL 
1227154, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 11, 2012); De La Cruz v. Children’s Trust of Miami-Dade 
Cnty., 843 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1276 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Sickels v. Cent. Nine Career Ctr., No. 
1:10–cv–00479–SEB–DKL, 2012 WL 266945, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 30, 2012); Holland v. 
Shinseki, No. 3:10–CV–0908–B, 2012 WL 162333, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2012); Azzam 
v. Baptist Healthcare Affiliates, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 653, 655 (W.D. Ky. 2012).                      
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Had the Berger study excluded all pendent state claims (as the 
Amendments Act study did), the results would show an even greater 
percentage increase than 14.9% in summary judgment denial.69 Regardless, 
any progress for disabled employees who have suffered employment 
discrimination marks a significant advancement for plaintiffs’ rights, 
especially given the prohibitively low plaintiff success rates revealed by the 
Berger study.70   
The fact that plaintiffs filing suit under the ADA can survive summary 
judgment motions at a higher rate after the Amendments Act should not 
come as a shock to those familiar with the Amendment. In fact, one legal 
scholar accurately predicted that “[t]he primary effect of the [Amendments 
Act] will be to remove existence of disability as a robust summary 
judgment issue for employers.”71 A necessary consequence of this effect is 
an increase in plaintiffs’ bargaining power during settlement negotiations,72 
which increases costs to employers. Regardless of increasing costs, the 
Amendments Act should be lauded for lowering the obstacle of summary 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 12-2484, 2014 WL 1584674, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 
22, 2014), rev’g 2012 WL 3945540 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2012); Mercer v. Arbor E & T, 
LLC, No. 11–cv–3600, 2013 WL 164107, at *20 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2013); Howard v. Pa. 
Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, No. 11–1938, 2013 WL 102662, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2013); 
Shelton v. City of Cincinnati, No. 1:11–cv–381, 2012 WL 5385601, at *24 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 
1, 2012); Coker v. Enhanced Senior Living, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1382 (N.D. Ga. 
2012); Harty v. City of Sanford, No. 6:11–cv–1041–Orl–31KRS, 2012 WL 3243282, at *1 
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2012); Socoloski v. Sears Holding Corp., No. 11–3508, 2012 WL 
3155523, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2012);  Holmes v. Cutchall Mgmt. Kan. LLC, No. 10–
2672–EFM, 2012 WL 3071056, at *1 (D. Kan. July 26, 2012); Dentice v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., No. 10–C–113, 2012 WL 2504046, at *21 (E.D. Wis. June 28, 2012); Schrack v. R+L 
Carriers, Inc., No. 1:10cv603, 2012 WL 2309365, at *14 (S.D. Ohio June 18, 2012); Pearce–
Mato v. Shinseki, No. 2:10–cv–1029, 2012 WL 2116533, at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2012); 
Wright v. Stark Truss Co., No. 2:10–2427–RMG–BM, 2012 WL 3029638, at *14 (D.S.C. 
May 10, 2012); Snyder v. Livingston, No. 1:11–CV–77, 2012 WL 1493863, at *17 (N.D. 
Ind. Apr. 27, 2012); McNamee v. Freeman Decorating Servs., Inc., No. 2:10–CV–01294–
GMN–PAL, 2012 WL 1142710, at *6 (D. Nev. Apr. 4, 2012); Mills v. Temple Univ., 869 F. 
Supp. 2d 609, 629 (E.D. Pa. 2012); Fleck v. Wilmac Corp., No. 10–05562, 2012 WL 
1033472, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2012); Barlow v. Walgreen Co., No. 8:11–cv–71–T–
30EAJ, 2012 WL 868807, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2012); Kravits v. Shinseki, No. 10–861, 
2012 WL 604169, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2012); Wells v. Cincinnati Children’s Hosp. 
Med. Ctr., 860 F. Supp. 2d 469, 489 (S.D. Ohio 2012); Molina v. DSI Renal, Inc., 840 F. 
Supp. 2d 984, 1007-08 (W.D. Tex. 2012).    
 69. See Berger, Finkelstein, & Cheung, supra note 45, at 62-63. 
 70. Id. at 59, 60 tbl. 5. 
 71. Jones, supra note 43, at 693. 
 72. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.  
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judgment for individuals who have impairments substantially limiting a 
major life activity but would previously have been unable to bring a 
successful claim under the ADA.  
The pendulum seems to have swung back too far, however, because 
many courts assume a disability exists when faced with somewhat close 
calls under the Amendments Act.73 This skips a vital step in the analysis—
the threshold requirement for the application of the ADA.74 Moreover, upon 
analyzing the bases on which courts are granting summary judgment under 
the Amendments Act, it seems that the plaintiff’s qualified individual 
burden under the ADA has overcompensated for the more lenient standard 
of proving an ADA disability.      
2. The Amplified Role of the Qualified Individual Determination 
Whereas a plaintiff’s lack of disability served as the primary basis for 
granting summary judgment under the ADA,75 the Amendments Act study 
reveals that federal courts granted summary judgment based at least in part 
on the determination that the plaintiff was not a qualified individual in 
32.3% (10/31) of the opinions granting summary judgment.76 Furthermore, 
if the pro se cases would not have been excluded from the study, the 
qualified individual analysis would have been a major factor in granting 
summary judgment for an astounding 38.2% (13/34) of the cases where 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See infra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.  
 74. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (2014) (“The determination of whether an 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment.”); 
see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (stating that no employer “shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual on the basis of disability”) (emphasis added)).  
 75. See Amy L. Allbright, 2010 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Titles I and V—
Survey Update, 35 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 394, 396 (2011).  
 76. See Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 91 (1st Cir. 2012); Wurzel v. 
Whirlpool Corp., 482 F. App’x 1, 11 (6th Cir. 2012); Mashek v. Soo Line R.R. Co., No. 11–
487 (MJD/JJG), 2012 WL 6552795, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2012); Walker v. Venetian 
Casino Resort, LLC, No. 02:10–CV–00195–LRH–VCF, 2012 WL 4794149, at *15 (D. Nev. 
Oct. 9, 2012); Torres v. Bremen Castings, Inc., No. 3:11–CV–035, 2012 WL 4498876, at 
*11-*12 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2012); Diaz v. City of Phila., No. 11–671, 2012 WL 1657866, 
at *9, *14 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2012); Lloyd v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, Ala., 857 F. 
Supp. 2d 1252, 1264, 1269 (M.D. Ala. 2012); McDaniel v. Piedmont Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 
22, No. CIV–11–373–M, 2012 WL 1227154, at *4, *6 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 11, 2012); De La 
Cruz v. Children’s Trust of Miami-Dade Cnty., 843 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1280-81 (S.D. Fla. 
2012); Azzam v. Baptist Healthcare Affiliates, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 653, 662 (W.D. Ky. 
2012).  
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summary judgment was granted to the employer.77 Even in many of the 
opinions denying summary judgment to employers, the qualified individual 
determination lay at the heart of the courts’ decisions.78 This proves that the 
qualified individual determination has become the major battleground in 
disability discrimination suits.  
In fact, Mashek v. Soo Line R.R. Co. shows that at least one court 
applying the Amendments Act has focused its entire analysis on the 
qualified individual decision, completely ignoring the other two prima facie 
elements.79 In Mashek, the district court in Minnesota stated that because 
the employee could not establish he was a qualified individual for his 
position, the court “need not address” the other prima facie elements.80 This 
type of cursory review seems to be more consistent with courts’ treatment 
of the disability determination pre-Amendments Act.81 As a consequence, 
employees bringing disability claims, especially pro se plaintiffs, may be 
particularly vulnerable to summary judgment motions alleging the 
employee is not a qualified individual under the ADA. 
3. Courts Are Still Granting Summary Judgment Because No Disability 
Exists 
Employees with some type of impairment do not automatically satisfy 
the disability prima facie element just because the definition of a disabled 
person has been expanded under the Amendments Act.82 In fact, some 
plaintiffs have failed to prove a disability even under the more lenient 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See Ivey v. First Quality Retail Serv., 490 F. App’x 281, 286 (11th Cir. 2012); 
Zurenda v. Cardiology Assocs., P.C., No. 3:10–CV–0882, 2012 WL 1801740, at *9 
(N.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012); Hardin v. Christus Health Se. Tex. St. Elizabeth, No. 1:10–CV–
596, 2012 WL 760642, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2012).   
 78. See, e.g., Coker v. Enhanced Senior Living, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1377-79 
(N.D. Ga. 2012); Barlow v. Walgreen Co., No. 8:11–cv–71–T–30EAJ, 2012 WL 868807, at 
*5-*6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2012).  
 79. 2012 WL 6552795, at *6-*7.   
 80. Id. at *6. 
 81. Although the court in Mashek may have ignored the other two prima facie elements 
in order to conserve judicial resources, this type of analysis would have been unfathomable 
prior to the adoption of the Amendments Act. Before the Amendment, courts were much 
more likely to grant summary judgment based on the employee’s lack of a disability, 
ignoring the other prima facie elements. See Allbright, supra note 75, at 396.    
 82. See, e.g., Poper v. SCA Ams., Inc., No. 10–3201, 2012 WL 3288111, at *7-*9 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 13, 2012) (finding temporary back pain was not a disability under the Amendments 
Act); Ratcliff v. Mountain Brook Bd. of Educ., No. 2:11–CV–0029–KOB, 2012 WL 
1884898, at *3 (N.D. Ala. May 22, 2012) (finding high blood pressure and occasional “ill 
and woozy feelings” did not make the plaintiff disabled under the Amendments Act).  
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Amendments Act standards. The Amendments Act study shows that 22.6% 
(7/31) of the time, courts relied solely on the employee’s lack of an ADA 
disability in granting summary judgment to the employer.83 While over 
20% represents a substantial percentage, this figure signifies a major 
decline from pre-Amendments Act case law, when a large majority of ADA 
claims brought were terminated at the summary judgment stage due to 
plaintiffs’ failure to establish a disability.84 Because the Supreme Court 
prohibitively construed the definition of a disability pre-Amendments Act, 
many deserving employees were effectively prevented from bringing their 
disability claims.85 In the legislative history of the Amendments Act, the 
House Committee on Education and Labor explained the abuse of the 
summary judgment device concerning the plaintiff’s failure to establish he 
was disabled under the original ADA: 
Too often cases have turned solely on the question of whether 
the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; too rarely have 
courts considered the merits of the discrimination claim, such as 
whether adverse decisions were impermissibly made by the 
employer on the basis of disability, reasonable accommodations 
were denied inappropriately, or qualification standards were 
unlawfully discriminatory.86 
 Perhaps the frequency of cases turning solely on the question of whether 
the plaintiff is disabled has been reduced to an appropriate level under the 
Amendments Act. On the other hand, having a “disability” under the new 
ADA may have lost all of its common sense meaning.87 Regardless, the 
Amendments Act study shows that although courts have granted summary 
judgment to employers less often based on the employee’s lack of a 
disability, courts are still finding a lack of a disability in some cases. 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See Johnson v. City of Murray, 909 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1295 (D. Utah 2012); Love v. 
Baptist Mem’l Hosp.–N. Miss., Inc., No. 2:10CV176–SA–JMV, 2012 WL 4465569, at *4 
(N.D. Miss. Sept. 25, 2012); Mota v. Aaron’s Sales & Lease Ownership, No. 11–4298, 2012 
WL 3815332, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2012); Poper, 2012 WL 3288111, at *9; Jenkins v. 
Med. Labs. of E. Iowa, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 946, 960 (N.D. Iowa 2012); Robinson v. 
Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 10–CV–834 (SJF)(ETB), 2012 WL 1980410, at *7 
(E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2012); Ratcliff, 2012 WL 1884898, at *3. 
 84. See Allbright, supra note 75, at 396.  
 85. See infra text accompanying note 196.  
 86. H.R. REP. NO. 110–730(I), at 8 (2008). 
 87. See Carol J. Miller, EEOC Reinforces Broad Interpretation of ADAAA Disability 
Qualification: But What Does “Substantially Limits” Mean?, 76 MO. L. REV. 43, 61 (2011).     
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
128 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:111 
 
 
B. The Practical Effects of Focusing on Job Qualifications Rather than 
Whether an Individual Is Disabled 
In summary dispositions under the Amendments Act, the role of the 
qualified individual determination seems to have evolved naturally. The 
primary purpose of the Amendments Act was to make it easier for 
employees to show they have a disability within the meaning of the ADA; 
so intuitively, the disability determination will no longer serve as such a 
strong weapon for employers. The third prima facie element, requiring a 
plaintiff to show that she was discriminated against “on the basis” of her 
disability,88 is also not a source employers can consistently rely upon for 
achieving victory at the summary judgment stage. Because the causation 
requirement is a highly factual determination, often based on conflicting 
testimonies, this element is rarely an appropriate one for summary 
judgment.89  
As a result, the qualified individual determination is the most viable 
basis for employers to win at the summary judgment stage under the 
Amendments Act. Employers and human resource departments seem to be 
slightly ahead of the curve compared to legal commentators in recognizing 
this fact. One human resources article has advised its readers, “[Y]our main 
defense will be that despite reasonable accommodations, a disabled 
employee still couldn’t perform the essential job functions.”90 Furthermore, 
that article provided the following advice concerning what employers 
should do to protect themselves from potential ADA lawsuits: “First, 
update your job descriptions. Determine ahead of time which job functions 
are essential—as opposed to marginal. If you have job descriptions, dust 
them off and review them closely to make sure they accurately set forth the 
position’s essential functions.”91 This advice happens to be quite consistent 
with current EEOC regulations, which state that essential functions are the 
“fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a 
disability holds or desires . . . [and do] not include the marginal functions of 
the position.”92  
                                                                                                                 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).  
 89. See Fleck v. Wilmac Corp., No. 10–05562, 2012 WL 1033472, at *11-*12 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 27, 2012).   
 90. Jonathan R. Mook, Five Steps to Protect Your Company from Claims Under New 
ADA, HR HERO LINE (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.hrhero.com/hl/articles/2010/09/09/five-
steps-to-protect-your-company-from-claims-under-new-ada/.  
 91. Id.   
 92. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2014).  
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To guide the qualified individual analysis, EEOC regulations list several 
concrete factors courts may consider in determining whether a function is 
essential to the job, including  
[t]he employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; 
[w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or 
interviewing applicants for the job; [t]he amount of time spent 
on the job performing the function; [t]he consequences of not 
requiring the incumbent to perform the function; [t]he terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement; [t]he work experience of past 
incumbents in the job; and/or [t]he current work experience of 
incumbents in similar jobs.93        
Following the EEOC’s mandates, employers will now have to determine 
which functions are truly essential, rather than marginal, for each position 
within their companies. But, because of the guidance provided by the 
EEOC, this will not be a blind undertaking. Another benefit of the guidance 
provided by the EEOC regulations will be the predictability and consistency 
it may create among the federal courts. Because courts have to apply the 
same limited number of factors to each case, a clear spectrum of what does 
and does not constitute an essential function will likely emerge. Thus, the 
shift in focus to the qualified individual analysis will likely bring many 
advantages. But it may include negative consequences as well.   
C. Has Congress Created a Perverse Incentive for Employers? 
Although yet unrealized, the Amendments Act might have the 
unintended effect of creating an incentive for employers to inflate job 
descriptions to bar disabled individuals from positions. Because many 
employers know that any impaired individuals they hire will have a 
stronger chance of successfully suing under the Amendments Act, they 
might distort the physical and mental demands of a job such that individuals 
with impairments cannot meet the threshold. In doing so, such employers 
could purport to be justified for refusing to hire an individual with a 
potential disability under the Amendments Act, so long as that individual 
fails to meet one of the heightened requirements for the position.94 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Id. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(vii).   
 94. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (stating that only qualified individuals are 
protected under the Amendments Act).  
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In theory, if discriminatory intent motivates employers to raise their job 
qualifications, they would be liable for employment discrimination.95 In 
reality, though, even if employers intentionally screen out qualified job 
applicants with disabilities, it is unlikely that disabled employees rejected in 
the application process will bring ADA claims for discrimination in the 
hiring process.96 Victims of hiring discrimination may refuse to bring 
discrimination suits for a litany of reasons. They may not know of their 
rights under the ADA.97 Even if they are aware of those protections, they 
“may find the remedy insufficient, the prospect of success slight, the advent 
of success long-delayed, or the enforcement procedures complex and 
intimidating.”98 Moreover, with the looming need to find employment, 
these victims may “simply wish to forget [their] pain and get on with [their 
lives].”99 In contrast, most current employees have invested their own 
human capital into skills specific to a position and are, therefore, more 
prone to sue when they believe they have been discriminated against.100 For 
these reasons, the number of claims brought against employers for failure to 
hire is largely overshadowed by the number of claims brought by current or 
former employees.101  
Therefore, when faced with the costs of lawsuits for hiring 
discrimination (which have proven slight) and the potential costs for future 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id. (stating employers will be liable for discrimination with regard to job application 
procedures, among other things).   
 96. See Maurice E. R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 219, 253 (1995).  
 97. See id.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 254; see also George Rutherglen, Reconsidering Burdens of Proof: Ideology, 
Evidence, and Intent in Individual Claims of Employment Discrimination, 1 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 43, 75-76 (1993) (“[F]ew plaintiffs would go to the trouble and expense of 
bringing a claim for discrimination if they could easily seek an equally attractive job with 
another employer.”).  
 100. Rutherglen, supra note 99, at 75-76. 
 101. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1024 (1991) (noting the greater probability 
of a plaintiff bringing a wrongful termination claim than a failure to hire claim); Munroe, 
supra note 96, at 254; Rutherglen, supra note 99, at 75 & n.113 (citing a study finding that, 
out of sixty-four cases in which a plaintiff brought an employment discrimination claim, 
only one of those cases was brought by a plaintiff who applied for a job and was rejected); 
William G. Somerville III, Avoiding Lawsuits for Employment Discrimination, 20 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 277, 279 (1997) (“Most employment discrimination suits are brought by 
current and former employees, not by rejected applicants.”). 
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discrimination suits (which could be great),102 it seems likely that 
employers will typically choose to bear the costs  of the former. In this 
light, Congress may have won the battle in passing the Amendments Act, 
but there is a chance it will lose the war. Any hindrance to achieving 
“equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and 
economic self-sufficiency for [disabled] individuals” would be a major 
shortcoming in fulfilling the goals of the Amendments Act.103 Accordingly, 
drafters of further revisions of the ADA and EEOC regulations should bear 
in mind, and seek to avoid, this possibility.          
IV. A Call to Align: Harmonizing the Disability Determination Under the 
Amendments Act with the ADA’s Original Goals 
In addition to the increased importance of the qualified individual 
analysis, the major changes concerning who qualifies as disabled under the 
Amendments Act have had a drastic impact on cases applying the Act.104 
The broad principles of the Amendments Act have protected, and will 
continue to protect, an increasing number of individuals from 
discrimination based on their disabilities.105 However, the broad purposes of 
the Amendments Act fundamentally clash with Congress’s retention of the 
key requirement that impairments must substantially limit major life 
activities in order for an individual to be classified as disabled.106 The 
tension between these two conflicting standards has led to inconsistency 
and unpredictability in the courts.107 Adding to the confusion, courts must 
                                                                                                                 
 102. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 101, at 1024 n.131 (citing Richard A. 
Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513, 519 (1987)) (“Since 
firing costs are incurred in the future, whereas the costs of failure to hire are borne 
immediately, the former must be discounted in computing the net effect of discrimination 
laws.”) Depending on the likelihood that a job candidate will be terminated, there may be a 
“small (net) disincentive to hire [disabled people].” See id. at 1024.   
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2012).  
 104. See supra Part III.A.1.  
 105. See, e.g., Socoloski v. Sears Holding Corp., No. 11–3508, 2012 WL 3155523, at *4 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2012) (denying summary judgment where evidence showed that an 
employee of thirty-eight years was fired due to physiological conditions that most likely 
would not have been covered under the original ADA).   
 106. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).   
 107. Compare Curley v. City of N. Las Vegas, No. 2:09–CV–01071–KJD–VCF, 2012 
WL 1439060, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 25, 2012) (conducting its own analysis of “substantially 
limiting,” rather than giving deference to the Amendments Act’s instruction that the 
definition of a disability is to be determined according to the broad purposes of the 
Amendments Act), with Gesegnet v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., No. 3:09–CV–828–H, 2011 
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sift through numerous and sometimes conflicting statutes, regulations, and 
guidelines when applying the Amendments Act.108 Moreover, there is a lack 
of case law interpreting the Amendments Act and an abundance of case law 
interpreting the ADA.109 When faced with the choice of applying broad, yet 
vague principles or following concrete direction from pre-Amendments Act 
case law, some courts have chosen the latter, despite the Act’s primary goal 
of broadening the definition of disabled.110 But are these courts to blame, or 
is the real culprit a lack of guidance?  
Not only have federal courts applying the Amendments Act come to 
different conclusions when faced with similar choices, but some courts 
have simply failed to follow the explicit directions found in regulations111 
or have applied rationales specifically rejected by the Amendments Act.112 
The most likely explanation for these erroneous decisions is the difficulty in 
navigating the scattered layout of the Amendments Act’s many regulations 
and statutes. These decisions could also be a product of the conflicting 
                                                                                                                 
WL 2119248, at *4 (W.D. Ky. May 26, 2011) (assuming the plaintiff had a disability even 
though the court “doubt[ed] that the medical and personal evidence . . . [was] sufficient to 
show an actual inability to perform a basic function of life”).  
 108. An additional complication is the fact that the statutes and regulations became 
effective on different dates. While courts generally agree that the Amendments Act is not 
retroactive, a smaller number of courts have taken the time to consider whether the EEOC 
regulations apply retroactively. See, e.g., Allen v. SouthCrest Hosp., 455 F. App’x 827, 835 
(10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the regulations are not to have retroactive effect); Azzam v. 
Baptist Healthcare Affiliates, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 653, 660 (W.D. Ky. 2012) (citing EEOC 
v. AutoZone, Inc., 630 F.3d 635, 641 n.3 (7th Cir. 2010)) (same).   
 109. A search for the term “ADA” returned over 10,000 case results in WestlawNext’s 
online database, but a search for “ADAAA” returned only 560 cases.    
 110. See, e.g., Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 3:09CV498, 2010 WL 1495197, at *7 n.5 
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2010) (finding employee had no disability based on his Prinzmetal 
angina by relying on Toyota’s instruction that “an impairment that only moderately or 
intermittently prevents an individual from performing major life activities is not a substantial 
limitation under the ADA”), aff’d, 482 F. App’x 1 (6th Cir. 2012).   
 111. See, e.g., EEOC v. Res. for Human Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688, 695 (E.D. La. 
2011) (referring incorrectly to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3) (2011) as stating that an individual 
proceeding under a failure to accommodate claim does not have to prove she has an actual 
disability or record of such a disability, even though the relevant regulations clearly stated 
otherwise).   
 112. See Zurenda v. Cardiology Assocs., P.C., No. 3:10–CV–0882, 2012 WL 1801740, 
at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012) (applying rationale from Toyota that, to be disabled, an 
impairment must significantly restrict an individual “from doing activities that are of central 
importance to most people’s daily lives”). This reasoning was specifically rejected by the 
Amendments Act. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(b)(4), 122 
Stat. 3553, 3554. 
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standards currently existing within the statutes and regulations. To align the 
Amendments Act with the original goals of the ADA and provide consistent 
guidance for federal courts applying the Amendments Act, this Part offers a 
few suggestions for Congress and the EEOC regarding the disability 
determination under the current statutes and regulations. 
A. The Ever Ambiguous Standard: The EEOC Should Provide Affirmative 
Guidance for Interpreting “Substantially Limits”  
The majority of the EEOC’s rules of construction for interpreting when 
impairments substantially limit a major life activity are devoted to 
explaining how not to make that determination.113 EEOC regulations only 
provide affirmative guidance for making this determination in two sections 
of the regulations.114 The EEOC first provides a list of impairments that will 
“in virtually all cases” substantially limit a major life activity.115 For 
example, it clarifies that deafness and blindness will always constitute 
disabilities.116 Second, the regulations allow for the consideration of the 
condition, manner, or duration in which the individual performs the major 
life activity.117 But even though the EEOC allows courts to consider such 
factors while conducting their substantial limitation analysis, these tools of 
construction are not very helpful. For one thing, the Interpretive Guidance 
offers only a few examples of how to consider these three factors.118 
Additionally, the EEOC has made clear that these three factors are only 
discretionary tools for courts119 and, therefore, “may often be unnecessary 
                                                                                                                 
 113. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)-(2), (5) (2014).   
 114. Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii), (4)(i).  
 115. Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)-(iii).  
 116. Id.   
 117. Id. § 1630.2(j)(4)(i). This may consist of analyzing “the difficulty, effort, or time 
required to perform a major life activity; pain experienced when performing a major life 
activity; the length of time a major life activity can be performed; and/or the way an 
impairment affects the operation of a major bodily function.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(4)(ii).  
 118. See Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j)(4) (2014).      
 119. See id. (stating that these factors may be considered when appropriate). This 
Comment does not suggest that the condition, manner, and duration factors should be used 
as part of a rigid test. Rather, even when considered, these factors do not provide sufficient 
affirmative guidance for courts to determine whether an impairment substantially limits a 
major life activity.      
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to conduct the analysis of whether an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a 
major life activity.”120      
Another regulation appears to offer affirmative guidance at first glance, 
but a closer look at the Interpretive Guidance reveals the contrary. This 
regulation states that “[a]n impairment is a disability within the meaning 
of . . . [the ADA] if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to 
perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general 
population.”121 Under the original ADA, an individual was considered 
substantially limited with regard to a major life activity when she was 
“[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the 
general population can perform.”122 The EEOC clarified that the change 
from the “average person” standard to the “most people” standard “is not a 
substantive change in the concept, but rather is intended to conform the 
language to the simpler and more straightforward terminology used in the 
legislative history to the Amendments Act.”123 Because this change was not 
meant to substantively change the “substantially limits” analysis, it provides 
no affirmative guidance to courts concerning how the new definition of a 
disability differs from the old one under the original ADA.  
The only other “guidance” given to courts is the implicit understanding 
that “the term ‘substantially limits’ shall be interpreted and applied to 
require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for 
‘substantially limits’ applied prior to the ADAAA.”124 In a similar vein, 
EEOC regulations clarify what is not required for a plaintiff to prove a 
substantially limiting impairment. Specifically, the relevant regulation 
states that an impairment “need not prevent, or significantly or severely 
restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be 
considered substantially limiting.”125 But exactly what degree of functional 
limitation is required? Before much case law surfaced interpreting the 
Amendments Act, one professor realized the tension in the conflicting 
ideals embodied in the rules of construction and the Amendments Act’s 
stated purposes.126 Professor Carol Miller, writing on the subject in 2011, 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978, 16,984 (Mar. 25, 2011) (codified as 
amended at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630) (emphasis added). 
 121. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2014).  
 122. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (1992).  
 123. Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(v) (2012). 
 124. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (2012).  
 125. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).  
 126. See Miller, supra note 87, at 61.   
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accurately predicted that courts would see that despite the broad 
congressional purposes of the Amendments Act, the definition of a 
disability under the EEOC is “counterintuitive to the common sense 
meaning of ‘substantially limits.’”127 In other words, “[h]ow can an 
impairment ‘substantially limit’ a major life activity and simultaneously 
‘not significantly or severely restrict’ the same activity?”128      
In addition to Professor Miller, one district court recognized the 
seemingly odd construction that courts are forced to place on the word 
“substantially.”129 In Curley v. City of North Las Vegas, the employee 
suffered from a hearing impairment that diminished his ability to fully 
recognize the words of others.130 Even with this impairment, however, the 
employee could still “achieve 96% in speech recognition.”131 In ruling that 
the “actual disability” prong had not been satisfied under the Amendments 
Act, the court stated that if such a minimal amount of hearing impairment 
could qualify an individual as disabled, it would render the ADA’s 
“‘substantial’ limitation” language meaningless because “any hearing 
impairment could constitute a disability.”132 The court found this level of 
impairment insufficient to label the plaintiff as disabled and, accordingly, 
granted summary judgment to the employer.133   
Similarly, in Robinson v. Roosevelt Union Free School District, the 
employee failed to prove that her leg, back, and hip disabilities inhibited her 
in a substantial way.134 More specifically, even though the plaintiff claimed 
she was “limited in her ability to . . . walk up stairs, stand for long periods 
of time, lift heavy objects, bend over, or engage in any physical activity,” 
she was unable to put forth evidence establishing the degree of her 
impairments.135 The court conceded that she had established that her major 
life activities were impaired, but her vague claims failed to prove that her 
impairment substantially limited any legitimate major life activity.136 Citing 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id.   
 128. Id.   
 129. Curley v. City of N. Las Vegas, No. 2:09–CV–01071–KJD–VCF, 2012 WL 
1439060, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 25, 2012); see also Allen v. SouthCrest Hosp., 455 F. App’x 
827, 832-33 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding that the plaintiff had to “make more than a conclusory 
showing that she was substantially limited in the major life activity of caring for herself”). 
 130. Curley, 2012 WL 1439060, at *3.   
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.  
 134. No. 10–CV–834 (SJF)(ETB), 2012 WL 1980410, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2012).   
 135. Id. at *7.  
 136. Id.    
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a Second Circuit three-part test, which requires a plaintiff to prove “(1) that 
she suffers from a physical or mental impairment, which (2) limits a ‘major 
life activity,’ (3) ‘substantially,’” the court granted summary judgment to 
the employer.137 Although this test simply reiterates the statutory definition, 
it correctly forces courts to separately consider the degree of limitation an 
impairment places on a major life activity—not just whether the impairment 
limits such an activity at all.   
Just as Professor Miller predicted, courts have had difficulty reconciling 
the broad purposes of the Amendments Act with the materiality 
requirement imposed by the term “substantially” limiting.138 More courts 
can be expected to reach outcomes similar to those in Curley and Robinson 
because the lack of direction remains when these two competing interests 
collide with one another. Courts will inevitably take one of two approaches 
when faced with a “close call” of whether the plaintiff suffers from an 
actual disability under the Amendments Act. Like in Curley, courts could 
adopt their own understanding of what level of impairment rises to a 
“substantial” limitation, thereby conducting their own weighing analysis.139 
Otherwise, they will probably follow the purpose of the Amendments Act 
and assume that a disability exists without extensive analysis140 because the 
definition of disability “shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of 
individuals.”141   
To avoid this problem, Professor Miller suggests, as one approach, that 
Congress could eliminate the “substantial” limitation wording and create a 
more fitting, intermediate standard for implementing the Amendments 
Act.142 This approach makes sense due to the fact that the phrase 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Id. (citing a pre-Amendments Act test from Weixel v. Board of Education of City of 
New York, 287 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 2002), and refusing to rely upon any post-
Amendments Act cases in making the disability determination).   
 138. See Miller, supra note 87, at 61.    
 139. See Curley v. City of N. Las Vegas, No. 2:09-CV-01071-KJD-VCF, 2012 WL 
1439060, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 25, 2012) (holding that 3% whole body hearing impairment 
does not pass the substantial limitation threshold).  
 140. See, e.g., Gesegnet v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., No. 3:09–CV–828–H, 2011 WL 
2119248, at *4 (W.D. Ky. May 26, 2011) (assuming the plaintiff had a disability even 
though the court “doubt[ed] that the medical and personal evidence . . . [was] sufficient to 
show an actual inability to perform a basic function of life.”); see also Jana K. Terry, The 
ADA Amendments Act Three Years After Passage: The EEOC’s Final Regulations and the 
First Court Decisions Emerge at Last, FED. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 2011, at 49, 53-54 (listing 
cases where courts assume a disability but express their doubts).  
 141. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012).   
 142. Miller, supra note 87, at 78-79.   
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“substantially limits” no longer holds its “common sense meaning.”143 
Changing the language would also obviate the difficult task of courts 
having to place an individual’s impairment somewhere between two 
completely opposite poles. This approach, however, fails to recognize that 
with each major overhaul of the ADA, the possibility for confusion 
exponentially increases. The Amendments Act case law makes abundantly 
clear that courts have struggled to reconcile a historic piece of legislation 
(the ADA) with its even more ambitious amendment.144 Hurling another 
major change at federal courts would only exacerbate the problem. Even 
Congress recognized this fact. After extensively considering whether to 
adopt a new standard of functional limitation under the Amendments Act, it 
ultimately concluded that “adopting a new, undefined term that is subject to 
widely disparate meanings is not the best way to achieve the goal of 
ensuring consistent and appropriately broad coverage under [the] Act.”145   
Consequently, the EEOC may be obliged to maintain the “substantial” 
limitation wording, even if it is forced to graft onto it a new meaning. To 
create consistent results in the federal courts, though, more positive 
guidance must be given by the EEOC. This approach, which Professor 
Miller also suggested in some form, represents the most workable 
compromise given the circumstances.146 Fortunately, affirmative guidance 
for such an approach already exists in a statement issued by Representatives 
Steny Hoyer and Jim Sensenbrenner during the legislative history of the 
Amendments Act. Their approach, which the EEOC should adopt, specifies 
that an impairment substantially limits a major life activity when it 
“materially restricts” a major life activity.147 They explained the proper 
analysis of when an impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity 
as follows: 
“Substantially limits” has been defined as “materially restricts” 
in order to communicate to the courts that we believe that their 
interpretation of “significantly limits” was stricter than we had 
intended. On the severity spectrum, “materially restricts” is 
meant to be less than “severely restricts,” and less than 
                                                                                                                 
 143. See id. at 61.  
 144. See supra notes 105-112 and accompanying text.  
 145. Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2014).       
 146. Miller, supra note 87, at 78.    
 147. 154 CONG. REC. 13,766 (2008) (joint statement of Reps. Hoyer & Sensenbrunner).  
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“significantly restricts,” but more serious than a moderate 
impairment which would be in the middle of the spectrum.148 
Even though this analysis was not incorporated into the final codified form 
of the Amendments Act, it proves that the EEOC has means to provide 
affirmative guidance for the disability determination, while maintaining the 
original “substantial” limitation language that Congress seems resolved to 
keep. However the EEOC chooses to amend the regulations, recent case 
law makes abundantly clear that merely explaining what a disability is not 
will only lead to continued misunderstandings.  
B. Overly Broad “Regarded As” Coverage: “Regarded As” Individuals 
Should Have to Prove More Than Just an Impairment  
As in the substantial limitation analysis, the degree of (perceived) 
limitation caused by an impairment should be a relevant factor in 
determining whether a disability exists under the “regarded as” prong. 
Under the Amendments Act, however, the individual alleging that he has 
been regarded as disabled need only prove that an employer discriminated 
against him “because of an actual or perceived physical or mental 
impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a 
major life activity.” 149 This is true unless the impairment is both transitory 
and minor.150 Under this rule, almost any individual with some appreciable 
impairment (or perceived impairment) may qualify as being “regarded as” 
disabled.151 More specifically, an actual or perceived impairment does not 
have to limit a major life activity in any way whatsoever if the 
“impairment” lasts or is expected to last longer than six months.152  
Snyder v. Livingston illustrates just how far coverage under the “regarded 
as” prong has extended under the Amendments Act.153 As a rare example of 
absolute adherence to the Amendments Act, the Snyder court refused to 
consider any pre-Amendments Act case law construing when an individual 
qualifies as disabled under the “regarded as” prong.154 For this reason, 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 110–730(I), at 9-10 (2008) (“In the range of severity of 
the limitation, ‘materially restricted’ is meant to be less than a severe or significant 
limitation and more than a moderate limitation, as opposed to a minor limitation.”).  
 149. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 150. Id. § 12102(3)(B).   
 151. See, e.g., Snyder v. Livingston, No. 1:11–CV–77, 2012 WL 1493863, at *6 (N.D. 
Ind. Apr. 27, 2012).   
 152. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B).   
 153. See Snyder, 2012 WL 1493863, at *6-*8.  
 154. Id. at *7. 
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Snyder represents the unfiltered analysis mandated by the current regulatory 
scheme.155 The court began its analysis by reciting the Amendments Act’s 
broad purposes of construing the definition of disability “broadly in favor 
of expansive coverage” and focusing primarily on “whether discrimination 
has occurred, not whether the individual meets the definition of 
disability.”156 Next, it cited post-Amendments Act case law recognizing that 
while the original ADA required a showing of substantial limitation, the 
Amendments Act now encompasses a perceived impairment “whether or 
not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”157 
Applying the statutes and regulations to the facts, the court found a 
genuine issue of fact remained with respect to whether the employer 
regarded the plaintiff as disabled, and it denied summary judgment.158 
Surprisingly, the only evidence the plaintiff offered to defeat summary 
judgment was a few statements made by her supervisor.159 The employee 
claimed that during a telephone argument with her supervisor, the 
supervisor called her “emotionally unstable” and told her she “should get 
help.”160 The supervisor’s version of the facts maintained that she only told 
the employee she “appeared to be on a bit of an emotional roller coaster and 
that no one knew how to act around her.”161 The final support offered by the 
court for its decision was the Amendments Act’s instruction that the court 
“is not supposed to engage in an extensive analysis of whether [the 
plaintiff] is disabled under the ADA,” but instead must focus on whether 
discrimination occurred.162 Basically, by applying the relaxed standards for 
the “regarded as” prong under the Amendments Act, the court eliminated 
the disability requirement under the ADA.  
Although financial considerations should not be the deciding factor in 
determining how much protection the ADA should afford, the costs of 
defending frivolous discrimination suits adds to the logic of adding a 
                                                                                                                 
 155. See supra Part II.  
 156. Snyder, 2012 WL 1493863, at *7 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (2012)). 
 157. Id. (quoting Becker v. Elmwood Local Sch. Dist., No. 3:10 CV 2487, 2012 WL 
13569, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2012)). The court’s analysis did not, however, mention the 
statutory provision stating that transitory and minor impairments cannot qualify an 
individual for coverage under the “regarded as” prong. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). Even if 
the court considered this statute, the plaintiff suffered from depression and mental problems 
for longer than six months, so the court’s conclusion would have remained the same.     
 158. Snyder, 2012 WL 1493863, at *8. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at *4. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at *8 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (2012)). 
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materiality component for coverage under the “regarded as” prong. One 
author recently hypothesized that the cost of providing reasonable 
accommodations to comply with the newly revised ADA will have an 
“economically significant” impact.163 As discussed by the EEOC in its 
notice of proposed regulations in 2009, the economically significant 
threshold is $100 million spent by employers throughout the country.164 
While the EEOC originally predicted that the total economic impact of the 
Amendments Act would not rise to this threshold,165 there exists evidence 
to the contrary.166 Although accommodations are not required for 
individuals claiming only that they have been regarded as disabled, the 
Amendments Act could nonetheless create a huge financial burden.167 This 
is because, with the ease of surviving summary judgment when bringing a 
“regarded as” claim, employers should expect to spend more to defend 
discrimination suits past the summary judgment stage than they had to 
before the Amendments Act’s effective date.168           
Snyder provides an example of courts construing the EEOC’s advice to 
“not demand extensive analysis”169 into a default rule that presumes a 
disability exists, especially under the “regarded as” prong of disability.170 
This analysis is inconsistent with Congress’s goals in passing the ADA. 
Originally, Congress maintained that “the Nation’s proper goals regarding 
individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full 
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such 
individuals.”171 This purpose cannot be fulfilled unless courts make an 
individualized assessment in each disability discrimination suit. No one 
should be subjected to discrimination in the workplace based on a 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Abigail Adams Kline, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act: 
Surpassing the “Economically Significant” Threshold, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 251, 
252 (2010).  
 164. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,431, 48,433 (Sept. 23, 2009) (codified as 
amended at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).   
 165. Id.  
 166. See Kline, supra note 163, at 252. 
 167. See id. at 278. 
 168. See, e.g., Saley v. Caney Fork, LLC, 886 F. Supp. 2d 837 (M.D. Tenn. 2012); 
Snyder v. Livingston, No. 1:11–CV–77, 2012 WL 1493863 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 27, 2012); Gaus 
v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 09–1698, 2011 WL 4527359 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2011). 
 169. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (2014).  
 170. See supra notes 153-162 and accompanying text. 
 171. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2012).  
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disability, whether it is perceived or actual.172 However, when individuals 
with absolutely no disability (even as perceived) are able to reach the trial 
stage in a suit based on nothing more than the mere jesting of a supervisor, 
they are taking advantage of ADA laws designed to place disabled people 
on an equal footing with everyone else. In other words, these frivolous 
actions undermine the importance of legitimate claims brought by 
employees who have actually suffered disability discrimination or have 
been perceived as having an actual disability. Accordingly, some degree of 
impairment should be required for employees proceeding solely under the 
“regarded as” prong, though the standard should not be as stringent as the 
standard used in determining whether an actual disability exists.                       
C. The Operation of a Major Bodily Function Is a Major Life Activity: 
Congress’s Faulty Determination That a Brick Is a Wall    
Another novel feature of the Amendments Act is its treatment of the 
operation of major bodily functions as major life activities. The 
Amendments Act states that major life activities include the operation of 
major bodily functions and creates a nonexhaustive list of qualifying bodily 
functions.173 The EEOC subsequently expanded this list and clarified that 
the operation of major bodily functions also “includes the operation of an 
individual organ within a body system.”174 There seems to be no limit on 
which bodily functions are covered under this standard. When considering 
the admirable goals of the Amendments Act,175 one may question whether 
this part of the Act is well calculated to redress the injustices caused by 
disability discrimination, namely “den[ying] people with disabilities the 
opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities 
for which our free society is justifiably famous.”176 Adding “the operation 
of . . . major bodily function[s]” into the analysis is overinclusive and is a 
deviation from what Congress originally intended when it stated that a 
                                                                                                                 
 172. The “regarded as” prong was “originally intended to express Congress’s 
understanding that ‘unfounded concerns, mistaken beliefs, fears, myths, or prejudice about 
disabilities are often just as disabling as actual impairments.’” Interpretive Guidance on Title 
I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(l) (2014). 
Significantly, “mistaken beliefs” or prejudices are not implicated when the supervisor does 
not actually believe the employee has any type of disability (or does not treat the employee 
in such a way), like in Snyder.           
 173. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).  
 174. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii).  
 175. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (including “assur[ing] equality of opportunity, full 
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for [disabled] individuals”).  
 176. Id. § 12101(a)(8).  
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disability exists when an impairment substantially limits a major life 
activity.177            
The functioning of some bodily systems has no bearing on whether an 
employee is disabled, or more specifically, whether a major life activity is 
substantially limited. For example, the common cold affects, among other 
things, the operation of the immune system. Should that mean that any 
person who has contracted the common cold is disabled within the meaning 
of the ADA? Surely not. The primary focus should be whether an 
impairment “substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a 
major life activity as compared to most people in the general population,”178 
not whether an individual is exhibiting the symptoms or side effects of his 
impairment. In determining that the symptoms of a person’s impairment 
substantially limit his major life activities, the Amendments Act “confuses 
the ADA’s concern for particular outcomes—‘equality of opportunity, full 
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency’ for people 
with disabilities—with a concern that persons with disabilities function 
normally.”179 
Nowhere has the Amendments Act purported to protect every person 
with any type of impairment from discrimination in the workplace. Instead, 
it has sought only to protect disabled people from the “unfair and 
unnecessary discrimination and prejudice” that hinder such people from 
gaining equal employment opportunities with the rest of society.180 
Therefore, only major life activities—those that have some minimal 
importance to an employee’s daily activities—should be relevant in 
considering whether that person has a disability. 
In some cases, courts have found a disability based solely on an 
impairment’s impact on a major bodily function, even though the 
impairment did not appear to substantially limit a major life activity.181 
Such was the case in Coker v. Enhanced Senior Living, Inc., where the 
court granted the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the 
sole issue that painful lumps and an unusual discharge from her breasts 
qualified her as actually disabled under the Amendments Act.182 Although 
the plaintiff undoubtedly experienced pain, the lumps were not cancerous, 
                                                                                                                 
 177. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).  
 178. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).  
 179. Jones, supra note 43, at 678-79.  
 180. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2012).  
 181. See, e.g., Coker v. Enhanced Senior Living, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1374-76 
(N.D. Ga. 2012).  
 182. Id. at 1368-69.  
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were removed through surgery, and did not seem to limit any major life 
activity.183 In other words, the plaintiff’s condition did not seem to impair 
her ability to work or conduct any other life activity, much less 
“substantially limit[] [such an activity] as compared to most people in the 
general population.”184 If the Amendments Act had not included the 
operation of major bodily functions as a major life activity, the plaintiff in 
Coker would likely have failed to receive summary judgment on the issue 
of disability,185 an outcome presumably inevitable under the original 
ADA’s requirement that only the substantial limitation of major life 
activities qualifies an individual as disabled.186   
The inclusion of major bodily functions under the umbrella of major life 
activities is a deviation from the original conception of the ADA. Although 
it will increase coverage of individuals under the ADA, it does so at a cost. 
This approach abandons the threshold determination of disability 
discrimination suits, which is whether the employee is a disabled person.187 
The operation of major bodily functions often has no bearing on the 
activities that are even somewhat important to an individual’s everyday life.  
Otherwise, what is the significance in the original ADA’s 
pronouncement, unaltered by the Amendments Act, that disabled people are 
those who have “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more major life activities?”188 Just like in the substantial limitation 
analysis, the complete dilution of the common sense meaning of words like 
“major” and “substantial” will continue to confuse federal courts charged 
with implementing the Amendments Act. The coherence of the ADA’s 
understanding of a disabled person is “of critical importance because as a 
threshold issue it determines whether an individual is covered by the 
ADA.”189 Therefore, the analysis should focus on activities important to an 
individual’s daily life because those concerns will legitimately separate 
those who are “disabled” under the ADA and those who are not. Then, the 
ADA’s goals of “assur[ing] equality of opportunity, full participation, 
                                                                                                                 
 183. See id.  
 184. Id. at 1375 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2012)).    
 185. See id. at 1375-76.  
 186. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994). 
 187. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.  
 188. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 189. Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(g) (2014).      
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independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for [disabled] 
individuals” will be more fully realized.190       
V. An Additional Hurdle Moving Forward: What Remnants of ADA Case 
Law Remain After the Amendments Act? 
Congress explicitly stated that the Amendments Act superseded the 
rationales of two Supreme Court cases,191 Sutton v. United Air Lines, 
Inc.,192 and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.193 
Congress specifically rejected Sutton’s requirement that “whether an 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with 
reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures,” and its 
requirement that an employer must perceive an employee as substantially 
limited in a major life activity for the plaintiff to succeed in bringing a 
claim under the “regarded as” prong of disability.194 The Amendments Act 
also rejected the Supreme Court’s following rationale in Toyota:  
[T]he terms “substantially” and “major” . . . “need to be 
interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying 
as disabled,” and that to be substantially limited in performing a 
major life activity under the ADA “an individual must have an 
impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from 
doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s 
daily lives.”195   
The stated rationales employed by the Supreme Court in Toyota and Sutton 
were superseded because they sharply “narrowed the broad scope of 
protection [Congress originally] intended . . . [under] the ADA, thus 
eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to 
protect.”196 
One relevant question that has not previously been posed, however, is 
whether the remaining portions of these Supreme Court decisions should 
still be cited as good law, assuming of course that the forbidden rationales 
are not being cited specifically. Neither the regulations nor the Interpretive 
                                                                                                                 
 190. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).   
 191. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(b)(2)-(4), 122 Stat. 3553, 
3554.   
 192. 527 U.S. 471 (1999), superseded by statute, § 2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. at 3554. 
 193. 534 U.S. 184 (2002), superseded by statute, § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. at 3554.  
 194. § 2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. at 3554.   
 195. Id. § 2(b)(4) (quoting Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197, 198).   
 196. Id. § 2(a)(4). 
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Guidance provide an answer to this question, but several post-Amendments 
Act courts have cited Sutton or Toyota in opinions applying the 
Amendments Act.197 One such case is Mota v. Aaron’s Sales & Lease 
Ownership.198 In this case, the district court quoted Sutton for its analysis of 
the major life activity of working: “To be substantially limited in the major 
life activity of working . . . one must be precluded from more than one type 
of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice.”199 Oddly enough, 
this standard from Sutton conforms quite well to the current Interpretive 
Guidance of the EEOC’s regulations. Those guidelines state that 
“[d]emonstrating a substantial limitation in performing the unique aspects 
of a single . . . job is not sufficient to establish that a person is substantially 
limited in the major life activity of working.”200 Because both Sutton and 
the guidelines are similar in this situation, the end result would probably 
have been the same regardless of which rule the court applied. 
Different results have been reached by courts interpreting the continued 
vitality of Toyota’s premise that temporary disabilities do not qualify for 
coverage under the “actual disability” prong of the ADA.201 In Feldman v. 
Law Enforcement Associates Corp., the court opted to defer to the 
Amendments Act’s guidance that the “definition of disability is to be 
construed ‘in favor of broad coverage of individuals . . . to the maximum 
extent permitted’ by the law.”202 The plaintiff survived the employer’s 
motion for summary judgment because the court distinguished the 
plaintiff’s impairment from the examples listed in the proposed federal 
regulations at the time, representing temporary conditions usually found to 
not substantially limit major life activities.203 
In Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., however, the district court did not even 
acknowledge the broad goals of the Amendments Act. Recognizing that 
only the principal holding of Toyota had been overturned, the court decided 
that Toyota’s incidental holding that “an impairment that only moderately 
                                                                                                                 
 197. See, e.g., Mota v. Aaron’s Sales & Lease Ownership, No. 11–4298, 2012 WL 
3815332, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2012) (quoting Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492); Wurzel v. 
Whirlpool Corp., No. 3:09CV498, 2010 WL 1495197, at *7 n.5 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2010) 
(citing Toyota, 534 U.S. at 199).  
 198. 2012 WL 3815332, at *4.  
 199. Id. (quoting Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492).   
 200. Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j)(5) and (6) (2014).   
 201. Compare Feldman v. Law Enforcement Assocs. Corp., 779 F. Supp. 2d 472, 485 
(E.D.N.C. 2011), with Wurzel, 2010 WL 1495197, at *7 n.5.   
 202. 779 F. Supp. 2d at 485 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012)).   
 203. Id. 
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or intermittently prevents an individual from performing major life 
activities is not a substantial limitation under the ADA” remained good 
law.204 Therefore, the court reasoned that according to Toyota, the 
plaintiff’s sporadic angina spasms, which cause dizziness, shortness of 
breath, fatigue, and tightness of the chest, did not place the plaintiff under 
the coverage of the Amendments Act.205   
Neither the Amendments Act nor accompanying EEOC regulations 
appear to forbid either of the approaches taken in these illustrative cases. 
Courts may defer to the broad purposes of the Amendments Act and choose 
to reject the incidental holdings of Toyota, like the court did in Feldman, or 
they may choose to retain them, like the court did in Wurzel. For purposes 
of consistency, though, courts should follow the same approach. This 
Comment suggests that the Wurzel court took the proper approach. 
Congress chose to only invalidate one specific holding in Toyota and two 
discrete holdings in Sutton,206 rather than to baldly state that the cases are 
no longer good law. So, as long as courts cite material from Sutton and 
Toyota that is consistent with the current statutes and federal regulations 
and unconnected to the standards denounced in the Amendments Act, 
federal courts are free to do so in their own discretion. As shown in Mota, 
because the major life activity of working analysis in Sutton is substantially 
similar to current EEOC regulations, following the Amendments Act and 
Sutton in this realm are synonymous undertakings.207   
On a broader level, there are many remaining case law formulas and 
standards (entirely separate from Sutton and Toyota) that lower federal 
courts created as guiding principles in the analysis of the three prima facie 
determinations in ADA discrimination suits. One example of such a 
surviving principle comes from McDaniel v. Piedmont Independent School 
District No. 22.208 In McDaniel, the district court reiterated a standard 
created by the Tenth Circuit in 2004 concerning the qualified individual 
analysis and how employers determine which functions are essential to a 
job position.209 McDaniel made clear that the Tenth Circuit’s pre-
                                                                                                                 
 204. Wurzel, 2010 WL 1495197, at *7 n.5 (citing Toyota, 534 U.S. at 199).  
 205. Id. at *10. 
 206. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(b)(2)-(4), 122 Stat. 
3553, 3554. 
 207. Mota v. Aaron’s Sales & Lease Ownership, No. 11–4298, 2012 WL 3815332, at *4 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2012). 
 208. No. CIV–11–373–M, 2012 WL 1227154 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 11, 2012).   
 209. Id. at *3 (citing Mason v. Avaya Commc’ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1118-20 (10th 
Cir. 2004)).    
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Amendments Act standard survived the passage of the Amendments Act, 
affirming that “[i]n cases arising under the ADA, [courts] do not sit as a 
super personnel department that second guess employers’ business 
judgments.”210 Because Congress left the qualified individual analysis 
unchanged from its pre-Amendments Act form, there seems to be no 
legitimate reason for denying lower federal courts, like the one in 
McDaniel, the discretion to apply such principles as they see fit (unless, of 
course, they are bound by conflicting standards created by a court with 
binding authority).        
When Congress passed the Amendments Act, it consciously reversed the 
trend of the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the ADA.211 
However, through its silence, Congress seems to have implicitly left all of 
the other lower federal court formulas intact. If Congress sought to 
eliminate all of this case law interpreting the ADA, it would have done so. 
But because it chose to forgo this opportunity, the most logical explanation 
is that federal courts are still bound by all case law under the original ADA, 
so long as the standards used are consistent with the principles of the 
Amendments Act and the current statutes and regulations. This presents a 
high degree of latitude for judges in the lower federal courts. In light of 
Congress’s focus on the disability determination, standards previously 
adopted by courts in handling the qualified individual, direct threat, and 
causation doctrines, just to name a few, will most likely continue in their 
previous forms since their analyses are somewhat removed from the 
disability determination. The next few years will reveal which standards are 
consistent with the spirit of the Amendments Act and federal judges’ sense 
of justice in administering the Act.          
VI. Conclusion 
The Amendments Act served as a much needed piece of legislation to 
help correct the inequities that disabled workers have historically faced in 
the workplace. Although inherent tension exists within the Amendments 
Act’s purposes and the existing statutory language, the new system 
substantially lessens the nearly insurmountable standards created by federal 
courts under the original ADA.  
As the survey of cases in the Amendments Act study reveals, summary 
judgment is granted less often under the Amendments Act than under the 
original ADA, allowing courts to consider the other elements of a plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                                 
 210. Id. (quoting Mason, 357 F.3d at 1122).  
 211. See § 2(b)(2)-(4), 122 Stat. at 3554. 
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prima facie claim. Moreover, the statistics indicate that the qualified 
individual determination is now the most prevalent basis on which 
summary judgment is granted. Consequently, written job requirements will 
play an ever-increasing role in employment discrimination suits. In 
addition, the EEOC should be aware of the potential barriers to employment 
that could be erected as a result of the increased importance of written job 
requirements.  
In some ways, the Amendments Act regulations implemented by the 
EEOC have maintained standards that sharply conflict with the ADA’s 
originally stated purposes. Especially with regard to the current guidance 
for making the disability determination, courts are left with two polar 
opposites from which to choose: following established precedent under the 
ADA versus attempting to comply with the broad, unspecified goals of the 
Amendments Act. Additionally, the lack of a materiality requirement for 
employees pursuing a claim under the “regarded as” prong and the 
inclusion of the operation of major bodily functions as major life activities 
are inconsistent with the original ADA’s notion of a “disabled” person.  
Until something is done to clarify which analysis courts should use to 
determine whether an impairment “substantially limits” a major life 
activity, there will be a lack of uniformity among the federal courts. 
Because Congress has already spent considerable time and effort to amend 
the ADA once, the EEOC is the most likely source for any changes in the 
implementation of the Amendments Act in the near future—assuming the 
Supreme Court refrains from stepping in again. The EEOC has the most 
flexibility and has already updated the accompanying federal regulations 
and Interpretive Guidance numerous times. Thus, EEOC regulations should 
retain the “substantial limitation” requirement in order to avoid another 
search for the meaning of a different unspecified term. Congress 
purposefully chose that phrase when it adopted the ADA. To continue this 
concept while implementing the broad goals of the Amendments Act, the 
EEOC needs to offer courts affirmative guidance for conducting the 
disability analysis. This can be achieved through the adoption of the 
“materially restricting” analysis suggested by Representatives Hoyer and 
Sensenbrenner in the legislative history of the Amendments Act.     
Most notably, the Amendments Act has substantially lessened the barrier 
to employees proving they are disabled under the ADA. While the limited 
case law has shown a glimpse of the Amendments Act’s effect, only time 
will tell whether its benefits ultimately outweigh its costs. 
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